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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate the impact on female labor force participation of a massive
conditional cash transfer program—Universal Child Allowance, AUH—launched in
Argentina in 2009. We identify the intention-to-treat effect by comparing eligible and
non-eligible women over time through a diff-in-diff methodology. The results suggest a
negative and economically significant effect of the program on female labor force
participation. The disincentive to participate is present for married women, while the
effect is not statistically significant for unmarried women with children. We also find
evidence on the heterogeneity of the effect depending on woman’s education,
husband’s employment status, number and age of children, and whether the woman is
the main responsible of domestic chores. The relatively large value of the benefit and
the fact that transfers are mostly directed to mothers may explain the sizeable effect of
the program on female labor supply. The welfare implications of the results are not clear
and deserve further inspection.
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1 Introduction
All countries in Latin America launched initiatives to extend social protection, in
particular through the implementation of conditional cash transfer (CCT) pro-
grams targeted to poor households with children. The literature that analyzes these
social protection schemes has strongly grown over the last years.1 The evidence
suggests that these programs have played a very important role in the short-term
reduction of poverty and income inequality in the region and in the promotion of
human capital accumulation in poor families (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Ibarrarán
et al. 2017). However, there is concern about some potential unintended effects of
these programs; in particular, they may imply a labor supply disincentive and a
bias towards unregistered labor arrangements (Levy 2008; Levy and Schady 2013;
Garganta and Gasparini 2015). Moreover, disincentives to labor market participa-
tion may be gender biased. The monetary subsidy raises household income and
therefore may reduce the need for an extra paid job, typically provided by the fe-
male spouse. Female labor supply may be discouraged through an additional chan-
nel, given that women are typically the recipients of the transfers. If the subsidy is
perceived as income earned by mothers, it may release them from the pressure to
seek employment or to work longer hours.2
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The existence and quantitative relevance of these unintended effects are at the core
of the current social protection debate in Latin America. The economic literature on
the impact of massive income programs on the labor markets is still incipient but
growing.3 This study contributes to this literature by assessing the potential impact on
female labor force participation of a large cash transfer program implemented in
Argentina, targeted to poor unregistered households with children. Specifically, the
Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (AUH for its acronym in Spanish) pro-
vides a monthly benefit per child to households whose members are unemployed or
working in the informal sector (i.e., unregistered). The AUH is a massive conditional
cash transfer program launched in 2009, which covers around 30% of all children under
18 years and more than two million families in Argentina (15% of total households in
the country). The real value of the AUH benefit per child, which has remained rela-
tively constant over time, represents 14% of the legislated minimum wage and hence a
significant rise of the mean household income for unemployed and informal house-
holds with children (i.e., the potential beneficiaries of the program). For a typical poor
participant household with three children, the benefit implies an increase of almost
35% in their total household income. These values place the AUH benefit among the
largest in Latin America (Stampini and Tornarolli 2013).
Cash transfers to poor informal households with children may reduce the parents’
participation in the labor market compared to the counterfactual situation in the ab-
sence of the program.4 We expect this effect to be higher for mothers due to at least
two arguments. The first one is that the income elasticity of labor supply tends to be
larger for females than for males, in particular for married women with children
(Michalopoulos et al. 1992; Kimmel 1998; Eissa and Hoynes 1999; Eissa and Hoynes
2004; Naz 2004; Tamm 2009).5 This difference is mainly driven by the fact that many
women decide their employment status sequentially in response to the decision of their
husbands or partners (Michalopoulos et al. 1992). Female labor decisions are more flex-
ible when they are not the only income earners of the household or the principal
worker of the family (Kimmel 1998).6 In Latin America, the role of women as second-
ary workers is reinforced by solid traditional family structures with a strong attachment
to traditional gender roles and low levels of women’s skills and educational attainment.
The second argument relies on the fact that women are typically the recipients of the
subsidy. Administrative data from the AUH program (ANSES 2014) reveals that in 96%
of the beneficiary households, the mother is identified as the principal holder/recipient
of the benefit. If the benefit is perceived as an income earned by mothers for taking
care of the children and checking the conditionalities of the program, it may discourage
the search for an additional job in the market. In summary, the program may reduce
the economic need for mothers to be actively engaged in the labor market and the
family/social pressure to do so.
Although there are reasons to believe that the AUH may reduce the incentives to par-
ticipate in the labor market, in practice, these disincentives could be quantitatively ir-
relevant or be compensated by forces operating in other directions. The actual
relevance of the potential disincentives of the program can only be determined with
empirical evidence. Unfortunately, it is not simple to identify the causal effect of the
program since it was not randomly assigned in the population. In addition, no ques-
tions aimed at identifying AUH beneficiaries were introduced in the national household
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survey of Argentina. Due to these constraints, our identification strategy consists in
comparing eligible mothers (poor and informal with children) with similar but non-
eligible women over time. This strategy of difference-in-differences is effective in allevi-
ating several endogeneity problems that arise when comparing heterogeneous
observations.
The evidence we present in this paper suggests fewer transitions from inactivity to
labor force participation for eligible mothers after the inception of the AUH, especially
among married women. The effect is not negligible: on average, it represents a fall of
24.7% in the probability of participating in the labor market, compared to what would
have happened in the absence of the program. We argue that the large size of the cash
benefit may account for such a sizeable effect. The program also seems to affect female
hours of work, although this result is not entirely robust to alternative definitions of
the control group. In contrast, both labor participation and total hours worked by men
are not significantly changed by the introduction of the AUH.
Interestingly, we also find an asymmetric labor adjustment to the program: while it
seems to reduce the transitions of inactive women to labor force participation, it does
not significantly affect the transitions from labor activity to inactivity. Given these dif-
ferential effects on female labor transitions, we conclude by suggesting that the ob-
served reduction in the labor participation rate among eligible women after the
AUH—in comparison with a more stable trend for non-eligible women—is mainly ex-
plained by a slower entry of eligible women into the labor force and not to a significant
increase in the exit rate.
The welfare implications of these results are not clear and deserve further research.
The discouragement of female labor force participation can not only be assessed as a
setback in terms of women’s empowerment, gender equality, and poverty relief but can
also be seen as a positive outcome of the program, if the subsidy allows poor women to
leave low-quality jobs to devote time to take care of their children or to seek for better
employment opportunities.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on social
policy and labor force participation. In Section 3, we explain the main characteristics of
the Universal Child Allowance program and discuss its potential effects on labor force
participation. Section 4 describes the data used in this study and lays out the method-
ology, while Section 5 presents the main findings. We conclude in Section 6 with some
final remarks.
2 Literature and background
There is a large variety of cash transfer programs implemented around the world with
potential consequences on the labor outcomes of the beneficiaries, particularly on
women’s participation. Leibbrandt et al. (2013) analyze the various mechanisms in-
volved in the employment decisions of individuals facing the introduction of these pol-
icies, stressing their significant incidence on female labor variables. These benefits may
entail a strong labor impact on women who are traditionally characterized by low par-
ticipation rates and an active involvement in household chores and childcare.
One of the income policies with high incidence on female labor participation is the
child support grants (CSG). This type of program, implemented by several countries,
consists of a cash transfer targeted to households with children focused on easing the
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childcare process. The objective of CSGs is twofold: improve the quality of childcare
and reduce its cost. The evidence indicates that the impact of these programs on labor
supply depends strongly on which of these two purposes dominates and how mothers
internalize this benefit. Kimmel (1998) shows that the change in childcare price gener-
ated by CSG programs tends to restrict the labor supply particularly of married women
considering they are not the only income earner of the family. In the USA, women
react to this type of income transfer substituting childcare services but without altering
their employment rate (Ribar 1995). Other authors find instead an increase in female
participation and labor intensity due to the introduction of CSGs both in developed
and developing countries (Williams 2007; Lefebvre and Merrigan 2008; Eyal and
Woolard 2011). Berger and Black (1992) reveal that women invest this transfer directly
on her children, increasing schooling attendance, which enables mothers to devote a
higher proportion of their time in the labor market. If this benefit is not exclusively
assigned to the child, it can generate a reduction in labor costs for mothers (e.g., finan-
cing job-seeking) and therefore may raise their labor force participation (Lefebvre and
Merrigan 2008).
Another important group of programs with significant impact on labor results are
those universal cash transfers or other minimum income benefits based on certain eli-
gibility criteria (means-test grants). These policies may induce either a positive effect
on labor supply (lower labor fixed costs) or a negative change on participation, particu-
larly when the amount of the benefit is close to the potential labor income (Franz et al.
2011). However, the literature shows a relative consensus for this group of programs.
The evidence suggests an adverse effect on labor supply, particularly motivated by the
lack of conditionalities and the magnitude of the benefits. Lemieux and Milligan (2004)
identify a significant reduction both of the employment rate and the total hours worked
by participants of a social assistance transfer in Quebec. Terracol (2009) and Bargain
and Doorley (2011) evaluate the impact on the labor market of a means-tested program
in France. They find an important fall in labor participation and larger unemployment
duration, since the transfer reception does not require any condition on seeking job.
Similarly, Cavalcanti and Correa (2010) find a negative labor effect of a cash transfer
program in Rio de Janeiro which benefits individuals with income below a certain
threshold regardless of their employment status. There is also evidence of a differential
impact between genders of these programs. For instance, a minimum income policy in
Albania discourages labor market participation, particularly of women living in urban
areas (Dabalen et al. 2008).
The conditional cash transfers, mainly implemented in Latin America, can also gen-
erate diverse labor effects. The evidence on these CCT programs is still scarce and far
from conclusive (Bosch and Manacorda 2012). Although several studies have found no
significant labor consequences in the short term (Amarante et al. 2011, 2011; Alzúa et
al. 2013; Galasso 2006; Skoufias and Di Maro 2008; Skoufias et al. 2008; Edmonds and
Schady 2012; Banerjee et al. 2015), some papers provide evidence that CCTs may dis-
courage labor supply in certain groups. Medeiros et al. (2008) reveal that the program
Bolsa Familia in Brazil reduced the probability of labor participation among eligible
women. Similarly, Ferro and Nicollela (2007), Teixeira (2010), and Scarlato et al. (2014)
find that some CCT programs have implied a decline in hours worked by women, in
particular those with greater restrictions to meet the requirements of these policies and
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with less assistance from other household members in domestic tasks. Accordingly, Gam-
mage (2010) sets forth the importance to consider the potential incidence of these pro-
grams on women time distribution between unpaid domestic activities and labor market
participation. Parker and Skoufias (2000) who show no major labor disincentive effects
from the Mexican CCT program (Oportunidades) do find instead a significant increase of
female hours aimed to fulfill the obligations set by the program.
In reference to the AUH, the main CCT in Argentina, the evidence related to its
labor impact is also incipient and mixed. Some previous studies show that the program
generated relevant labor disincentives (Boffi 2013; Garganta and Gasparini 2015;
Castillo et al. 2013) while others fail to find significant changes in adults’ labor supply
(Maurizio and Vazquez 2014; Kliksberg and Novacovsky 2015). For instance, Maurizio
and Vazquez (2014) find a slightly significant but not robust increase in the unemploy-
ment rate of beneficiary women. These authors, however, use a different identification
strategy and analyze the evidence over a shorter period of time (2009–2010) than our
study. In contrast, Castillo et al. (2013) highlight the greater labor precariousness of the
AUH participants compared to those workers under the traditional social security sys-
tem (TSS). They also reveal the lower chance of access to a stable job of the AUH
beneficiaries and the relatively worse paid employment they take on. These authors also
report a smaller participation rate among recipients and a higher probability of under-
employment than TSS workers. They state that this policy reinforces the determination
of women as the principal child care provider of the household. Although this can be
positive in some respects, it can also perpetuate the traditional domestic roles assigned
to them and strengthen their isolation from the labor market.
This paper considers that the AUH may generate a reallocation of roles between gen-
ders with a potential reduction in female labor participation. The hypothesis is sup-
ported by several arguments detailed in Section 3, some of them are based on general
empirical issues, and others are linked to the particular design of this policy.
3 The AUH and its potential effects on labor market participation
In November 2009—under stable economic conditions and with ample political sup-
port—the Argentinian government implemented a massive program of conditional cash
transfers to poor households.8 Specifically, the decree 1602/09 created the Universal
Child Allowance for Social Protection (AUH) which consists of a monetary subsidy per
child for households whose members are either unemployed or working in the informal
sector (unregistered workers).9 The decree also restricts participation to those unregis-
tered workers earning less than the legal minimum wage. However, this limitation is in-
consequential in practice since earnings of informal workers are difficult to monitor.
As any typical conditional cash transfer program (CCT), the AUH requires compli-
ance with education and health conditions: vaccination and health checks for children
under age 4 and for pregnant women and school attendance for children aged 5
through 18. To enforce these conditions, the program sets a particular payment mech-
anism: 80% of the subsidy is automatically received by beneficiary families on a monthly
basis, and the remaining 20% is paid annually, once compliance with the conditional-
ities is proven. If the conditions are not met, not only the 20% is not perceived but also
the beneficiary is suspended from future participation in the program.
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The program covers a large proportion of the Argentinian population, the majority
belonging to low-income strata. Currently, the AUH covers almost four million chil-
dren, which accounts for one third of all children in the country and 15% of total
households. The annual budget of the program—around 0.8% of GDP—is one of the
highest in Latin America. The monetary benefit is also high according to international
standards (Fiszbein and Schady 2009; Stampini and Tornarolli 2013). At the time of its
inception, the AUH transferred ARS 180 (around USD 50) per month for each child
under 18 years old up to a maximum of five dependent children per family.10 The
monthly amount per child has been adjusted several times to shield the purchasing
power of the subsidy against inflation. By June 2015, the monthly transfer per child was
ARS 837, representing around 12% of the mean household income for unemployed and
informal households with children and 14% of the legislated minimum wage.11 For a
typical poor beneficiary family with three children, the benefit implies an increase of
35% in total household income. The recipients of AUH are not allowed to receive bene-
fits from other social programs.
Being such a large program, the AUH may have a potentially significant impact on
economy-wide social and labor variables. The existing literature finds that the AUH
had a significant impact on the reduction of poverty and income inequality (Gasparini
and Cruces 2010; Agis et al. 2010), discouraged labor market formalization (Garganta
and Gasparini 2015), and increased school attendance (Edo et al. 2015). Although there
are also some few estimations of the effect of the AUH on adult’s labor supply, no con-
clusive evidence was found in this regard (Boffi 2013; Castillo et al. 2013; Maurizio and
Vazquez 2014; Kliksberg and Novacovsky 2015) and there are still no studies assessing
the impact of this program on labor participation with a main focus on the potential
gender bias that CCTs could actually incite.
There are several reasons to relate the AUH with a potential work disincentive, particu-
larly for women. The income effect associated to the cash transfer may discourage labor
participation of beneficiary family members, but especially of mothers for at least two
reasons. First, income elasticity of labor supply tends to be larger for women than for
men, particularly for women who act as secondary workers within their household
(Michalopoulos et al. 1992; Kimmel 1998; Eissa and Hoynes 1999; Eissa and Hoynes 2004;
Naz 2004; Tamm 2009). Many women decide their employment status sequentially in re-
sponse to the decision of their husbands or partners (Michalopoulos et al. 1992). As a
consequence, female labor decisions are more flexible when they are not the only income
earners of the household (Kimmel 1998). In particular, Latin American women are likely
to act as secondary workers because of the persistent strong attachment to traditional
gender roles and the low levels of women’s skills and educational attainment in the region.
The second reason relies on the fact that women are typically the recipients of the cash
transfer. According to administrative data from the AUH (ANSES 2014), the mother is
the principal holder/recipient of the benefit in 96% of the participant households. There-
fore, beneficiary women may perceive the transfer as earned income in exchange for their
efforts to ensure compliance with the conditionalities of the program, which encourages
the traditional division of gender roles within the household and reduces the pressure on
women to seek for a job outside the house. In summary, the AUH may reduce the eco-
nomic need of mothers to be actively engaged in the labor market and the family/social
pressure to do so.
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4 Data and methodology
Our analysis is based on microdata from Argentina’s national household survey
(Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, EPH) quarterly conducted by the national statistical
office (INDEC). The EPH covers 31 large urban areas, which represent 62% of total
country population. Since we aim to assess whether the AUH affected female labor sup-
ply, we exploit the rotation sampling of the EPH that allows us to observe changes in
labor variables over time for each individual in the sample. Specifically, we observe
each woman in the survey in two successive quarters, and then, we observe her again
1 year later in the same two consecutive quarters. In particular, we are interested in the
transition from inactivity to activity, i.e., women who were inactive in the first round of
observation (semester) and experienced a transition towards activity in the last one,
either by working or by actively looking for a job.12
We focus on the period 2005–2013. Since the AUH was launched in November 2009,
the pre-intervention or “before” period includes years 2005 through 2009 while the
post-intervention or “after” period covers years 2010 through 2013.13 Our sample in-
cludes inactive women between 20 and 60 years old who are the spouse or the head of
their households. Since the EPH does not include questions to identify AUH beneficiar-
ies, we aim at determining whether the household is a potential beneficiary of the pro-
gram by checking the eligibility criteria—intention to treat. Specifically, the treatment
group is composed of inactive women with children under age 18 who live in poor and
informal households. By informal household, we mean that neither the woman nor her
spouse is registered in the national social security system.14 This is the case for un-
employed and inactive individuals, unregistered workers, and, typically, self-employed
workers.15 We define poor families as those belonging to the first four deciles of the
household per capita income distribution.16 The control group includes the rest of the
women in our sample, i.e., inactive women between 20 and 60 years old who do not
meet all the conditions to be eligible. In the next section, we show that the results are
robust when using alternative control groups.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the treatment and control groups, both before
and after the inception of the AUH. Beyond some similar features between the two
groups, they exhibit, as expected, significant differences: eligible women are poorer,
younger, and less educated and have more children and larger families than women in
the control group.
Given that these discrepancies hold over time (before and after the AUH) and with
no significant changes on their magnitude, we apply a difference-in-differences meth-
odology in order to estimate the impact of the AUH on female labor participation.
Specifically, we compare the differences in the outcome of interest—the probability to
make a transition from inactivity to activity—between the treatment and the control
group, before and after the introduction of the program (Card 1990; Card and Krueger
1994; Bertrand et al. 2004). The identification assumptions are that labor force partici-
pation trends for both treatment and control groups would have been similar in the ab-
sence of the AUH and that there were no other contemporaneous events to the
implementation of the AUH that could have caused a differential impact on that out-
come between the two groups. The latter does not appear to be a strong assumption
considering that no new social programs nor labor market reforms took place during
the period under analysis. In fact, the AUH was the consequence of a political debate
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on the need to revitalize the social policy in Argentina. While the first assumption cannot
be proven, in the next section, we provide evidence to gain confidence in its validity.
Equation 1 represents the typical standard linear specification of the diff-in-diff model.
FPit ¼ αþ β1Treati þ β2Aftert þ γTreatiAftert þ θXi þ uit ð1Þ
The outcome variable FPit is a binary indicator taking the value 1 for inactive women
i who make the transition to activity in the labor market in year t and the value 0
otherwise. More precisely, if a woman i is inactive during her first two appearances in
the survey but in the last two interviews—1 year after the first one—she does work or
is actively looking for a job, then the dummy variable FPit equals 1.
17 The model in-
cludes the indicator variable Treat that takes the value 1 for the treatment group, the
dummy variable After that switches on for observations in post-intervention years 2010
through 2013, an interaction term between them, and a set of individual and
household-level controls represented by vector X.18 Individual controls include age, age
squared, educational level, marital status, whether the male spouse is employed, and
binary indicators of the head of household and of whether the woman is in charge of
household chores or whether other family members help with those tasks. Household
controls include per capita family income, family size, and number of family members
by age and gender—number of women aged 20 to 60, men aged 20 to 65, and children
under age 18. Also, vector X includes region and time fixed effects.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of estimation sample. Women aged 20–60—head of household or spouse
Variables Before AUH After AUH
Treat Control Diff. t p value Treat Control Diff. t p value
(i) (ii) (ii)–(i) (i) (ii) (ii)–(i)
Age 37.3 44.6 7.30 30.8 0.00 37.3 44.2 6.88 26.5 0.00
Years of education 8.20 9.73 1.53 20.0 0.00 8.40 9.91 1.50 18.5 0.00
Married women (%) 0.86 0.88 0.02 2.75 0.01 0.84 0.87 0.03 4.20 0.00
Women with
employed partner (%)
0.87 0.87 0.00 − 0.44 0.66 0.87 0.87 0.01 0.83 0.41
Household head (%) 0.19 0.15 − 0.04 − 4.92 0.00 0.25 0.19 − 0.06 − 5.99 0.00
Number of children 2.71 1.07 − 1.65 − 54.07 0.00 2.55 1.04 − 1.52 − 48.60 0.00
Number of members 5.48 4.17 − 1.31 − 32.40 0.00 5.34 4.08 − 1.26 − 28.81 0.00
Number of women
(20–60 years old)
1.22 1.37 0.16 11.68 0.00 1.22 1.35 0.13 9.12 0.00
Number of men
(20–65 years old)
1.11 1.25 0.14 9.18 0.00 1.10 1.24 0.14 8.02 0.00
Women in charge of
domestic chores (%)
0.96 0.94 − 0.02 − 4.20 0.00 0.95 0.94 − 0.01 − 1.75 0.08
Partner in charge of
domestic chores (%)
0.05 0.06 0.01 1.04 0.30 0.06 0.07 0.01 1.62 0.10
Household per
capita income
157.23 563.09 405.86 34.72 0.00 431.61 1405.84 974.22 33.29 0.00
Observations 2842 9374 2505 7530
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note 1: the sample includes all inactive women between 20 and 60 years
old who are the spouse or the head of their households. The treatment group is composed of inactive women with
children under age 18 who live in poor (first four deciles of the household per capita income distribution) and informal
households (neither the woman nor her spouse is registered in the national social security system) while the control
group includes the rest of the inactive women in our sample who do not meet all the conditions to be eligible. Before
AUH: 2005–2009. After AUH: 2010–2013. Note 2: Married women refers both to legally married women and women in
consensual unions
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Instead of a linear model, we carry out the analysis using the nonlinear specification
in Eq. 2, where the conditional expectation of the dependent binary variable is a nonlin-
ear function that follows a Probit specification.
Pr FPitð Þ ¼ Φ αþ β1Treati þ β2Aftert þ γTreatiAftert þ θXið Þ ð2Þ
where Pr(.) denotes probability. The impact of the program is estimated as
DD ¼ Φ αþ β1 þ β2 þ γ þ θXið Þ−Φ αþ β1 þ β2 þ θXið Þ ð3Þ
It is worth to mention that in the nonlinear model, the expected value of the poten-
tial outcome is not zero as in the linear specification. The treatment effect in this diff-
in-diff nonlinear model is the difference between two cross differences: the difference
of the conditional expectation of the observed outcome (factual) minus the cross differ-
ence of the conditional expectation of the potential or counterfactual outcome. As it is
shown in Eq. 3, the treatment effect will then be the incremental probability impact
caused by the coefficient of the interaction term (Ai and Norton 2003; Puhani 2012).
Being Φ(.) a strictly monotonic nonlinear function, the sign of γ will always coincide
with the sign of the treatment effect. These results apply to all nonlinear models with
this parametric structure.
5 Results
In this section, we present and discuss the results of estimating the diff-in-diff probit
model in Eq. 2 to evaluate the effect of AUH’s eligibility on the probability of entering
the labor market for inactive women. We also estimate the effects on other labor tran-
sitions potentially affected by the AUH: from activity to inactivity and from employ-
ment to being not employed. Besides these extensive-margin outcomes, at the end of
this section, we evaluate the effects on the intensive margin of labor supply by estimat-
ing the impact on hours of work.
Female transitions from inactivity to activity seem to have been affected by the AUH.
As Table 2 shows, the mean proportion of eligible inactive women that enter the labor
force decreased almost 2.2 percentage points after the introduction of the program,
which contrasts with the almost null change in the control group.19
To reinforce our confidence on the preliminary evidence from Table 2, we test for
common trends between groups before the introduction of the program. For this pur-
pose, we run a model of the outcome variable on a constant, the treatment dummy,
year dummies, and interactions between the treatment and year dummy variables
Table 2 Proportion of inactive women entering the labor force. Treatment and control group,
before and after AUH
Treatment (i) Control (ii) (i)–(ii)
Before AUH (a) 10.3 7.1 3.3
After AUH (b) 8.1 6.9 1.3
Difference after–before: (a)–(b) − 2.2 − 0.2 − 2.0
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note: the sample is composed of inactive women between 20 and
60 years old who are the spouse or the head of their households. The treatment group includes inactive women with
children under age 18 who live in poor (first four deciles of the household per capita income distribution) and informal
households (neither the woman nor her spouse is registered in the national social security system) while the control
group includes the rest of the inactive women in our sample who do not meet all the conditions to be eligible. Before
AUH: 2005–2009. After AUH: 2010–2013
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including only pre-intervention periods. We then apply an F test in which the null hy-
pothesis states that all the coefficients for the interaction terms are jointly equal to
zero. We find no evidence to reject the null hypothesis for all women in our sample.20
Therefore, the result suggests the existence of a common underlying trend for the
treatment and control groups before the implementation of the AUH, which then
appears to have been broken since the introduction of the program.
This initial evidence arises from an unconditional analysis, and hence, it must be con-
firmed through a more robust estimation of the treatment effect. In what follows, we
show that the result holds in a multivariate regression framework. Table 3 reports the
estimated change in the probability of the transition from inactivity to activity associ-
ated to the AUH, applying the diff-in-diff probit model in Eq. 2. The results suggest a
negative and significant effect of the AUH on the probability that inactive women enter
the labor force. This disincentive to participate is present among married women—both
legally married or in consensual unions—while the effect is not significant for unmar-
ried women with children. The estimated impact among married mothers accounts for
a 2.62 percentage point drop in the probability of making the transition to labor force
participation, which represents a reduction of 24.7% in the expected outcome of eligible
women in the absence of the AUH. On the other hand, the effect of the program on
eligible men is smaller and not statistically significant. These results are consistent with
the arguments discussed in Section 3: unlike men and single women, married women
usually act as secondary workers within their households; hence, their labor market
participation decisions are likely to be more sensitive to the income transfers from the
program.21 Given the heterogeneity found in Table 3, the following results focus on the
group of married women only.
The key identifying assumption of this causal impact is that eligible women would
have behaved similar to the control group in the absence of the AUH. The evidence of
common trends before the AUH suggests that this was the case in the pre-intervention
period, but the assumption itself cannot be tested. Therefore, we assess the likelihood
of its validity by performing false experiments. In particular, we estimate the treatment
effect as if the program was implemented before its actual inception date in 2009.
Table 4 reports the results of these placebo exercises, where no significant effects are
found. This suggests that the observed changes in female labor force participation be-
tween groups took place after the introduction of the policy, but not earlier.
Table 3 Effect of AUH on the probability of entering the labor force. Difference-in-differences
Probit estimates
All women Single women Married women Men
Treat × After − 0.0216*** − 0.00427 − 0.0262** − 0.0159
(0.00807) (0.0319) (0.0117) (0.0121)
Observations 22,251 2899 19,352 4129
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.162 0.038 0.180
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note: Probit estimates. The sample includes inactive women or men
(head of household or spouse). The age range is 20–60 for women and 20–65 for men. The dependent binary variable
equals 1 if the individual initially inactive experiences a transition to an active labor status. To apply a diff-in-diff
specification, we include variables Treat (equals 1 for eligible inactive women—with children in poor and informal
households), After (equals 1 for the period 2010–2013), and the interaction between them. We also add other control
variables: age, squared age, educational level, marital status, binary indicators of the head of household and of whether
the individual (or her/his spouse) is in charge of household chores, labor status of the spouse, per capita family income,
family size, number of members by age and gender, region fixed effects, and time fixed effects (quarters). Clustered
robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
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Another identification assumption is that there were no other contemporary events
to the AUH that could have a differential incidence in the outcome of interest between
groups. As discussed above, although it is not possible to rule out such contemporary
events, this is likely to be the case: the AUH was the main social policy initiative in
Argentina during the period under study (Rofman and Oliveri 2011), and it was not ac-
companied by any other social or employment initiative.
The results discussed so far are based on the comparison between eligible women
and a control group that includes the rest of the women in our sample, i.e., inactive
women aged 20–60 who do not have children under age 18, live in a non-poor house-
hold22, and/or her spouse is registered in the labor market. To check for robustness of
the results in Table 3, we estimate the impact of the AUH using four alternative control
groups: (i) only non-eligible women with children, i.e., we drop women without chil-
dren; (ii) only non-eligible women with no formal partner, i.e., we drop women married
to formal workers; (iii) only non-eligible women in poor households, i.e., we drop non-
poor women; and (iv) non-eligible women with two of the three main requirements,
i.e., combinations of the above groups taken in pairs. Table 5 shows that the estimated
Table 4 Effect of AUH on the probability of entering the labor force. False experiments
(placebo regressions)
False intervention in
2008 2007 2006 2005
Treat × After − 0.0143 − 0.00706 0.0114 0.00838
(0.0129) (0.0163) (0.0102) (0.0121)
Observations 10,700 10,700 10,700 10,700
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note: Probit estimates. The sample includes inactive married women
between 20 and 60 years old (head of household or spouse). The dependent binary variable equals 1 if the woman
initially inactive experiences a transition to an active labor status. For these placebo regressions, we restrict the sample to
the period before the AUH (2005–2009). To apply a diff-in-diff specification, we include variables Treat (equals 1 for
eligible inactive women—with children in poor and informal households), After (equals 1 for alternative false post-
intervention periods), and the interaction between them. We also add other control variables: age, squared age, educational
level, marital status, binary indicators of the head of household and of whether the individual (or her/his spouse) is in charge
of household chores, labor status of the spouse, per capita family income, family size, number of members by age and
gender, region fixed effects, and time fixed effects (quarters). Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01;
**p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
Table 5 Effect of AUH on the probability of entering the labor force. Alternative control groups
Control groups
Married women With children (i) Informal (ii) Poor (iii) P WCh, P I, I WCh (iv)
Treat × After − 0.0262** − 0.0162* − 0.0427*** − 0.0151** − 0.0262**
(0.0117) (0.00929) (0.0122) (0.00686) (0.0106)
Observations 19,352 12,916 9928 9870 10,836
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.033 0.059 0.044 0.039
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note 1: Probit estimates. The sample includes inactive married women
between 20 and 60 years old (head of household or spouse). The dependent binary variable equals 1 if the individual
initially inactive experiences a transition to an active labor status. To apply a diff-in-diff specification, we include variables
Treat (equals 1 for eligible inactive women—with children in poor and informal households), After (equals 1 for the
period 2010–2013), and the interaction between them. We also add other control variables: age, squared age,
educational level, marital status, binary indicators of the head of household and of whether the individual (or her/his
spouse) is in charge of household chores, labor status of the spouse, per capita family income, family size, number of
members by age and gender, region fixed effects, and time fixed effects (quarters). Clustered robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10. Note 2: Alternative control groups (married women): (i) non-eligible
women with children (i.e., we drop those women without children in the control group), (ii) non-eligible women in
households with no formal partner, (iii) non-eligible women in poor households, and (iv) non-eligible women with two of
the three main requirements—with children (WCh), poor (P), and with no formal partner (I)
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effects are all negative and significant, which reinforces the validity of the results found
in Table 3. Depending on the control group, the fall in the probability of participating
in the labor market for eligible married women ranges between 1.5 and 4.3 percentage
points. This represents a minimum and maximum reduction of 14 and 41% of the ex-
pected outcome without the program.
5.1 Heterogeneous effects
It is important to further explore whether the unintended effect of the policy on female
labor participation is heterogeneous across different groups of women. This may be
both informative and explanatory of the aggregate result. Isolating the treatment effect
on different groups of women could enable a better understanding of the transmission
mechanisms on female labor force participation that are probably triggered by this pol-
icy. Again, the analysis focuses on married women, taking all non-eligible women in
the sample as the control group.
First, we explore whether the effects vary depending on the labor condition of
women’s partners. Results in Table 6 suggest that disincentives to participate in the
labor force operate particularly for mothers with employed husbands. In fact, labor par-
ticipation decisions are expected to be more inelastic respect to the monetary transfers
for women whose spouses are not employed.23
We also evaluate heterogeneous effects across education groups. The disincentive to
labor participation seems to be important only for women with low levels of education
(Table 7). This may reflect the fact that less educated women have fewer or less attract-
ive labor opportunities, which makes them less willing to participate in the labor mar-
ket after the introduction of the AUH.24 In contrast, inactive women with potentially
better employment perspectives do not seem to be significantly affected by the pro-
gram, although the sign of the effect is still negative for this group.
Another heterogeneous impact of the AUH could be related to the number of chil-
dren.25 Presumably, the larger the benefit from the program, the greater the disincen-
tive to participate in the labor market. Assuming economies of scale in household
consumption, a constant transfer per child implies that per capita benefit increases with
the number of children. Therefore, under the hypothesis of negative income effects on
labor supply, the program would have a negative effect on female labor force participa-
tion particularly relevant for mothers with many children.26 However, Table 8 shows a
Table 6 Effect of AUH on the probability of entering the labor force. Heterogeneities: spouse’s
labor condition
Married women Employed spouse Not employed spouse
Treat × After − 0.0262** − 0.0259*** − 0.0230
(0.0117) (0.00891) (0.0283)
Observations 19,352 16,833 2453
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.034 0.194
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note: Probit estimates. The sample includes inactive married women
between 20 and 60 years old (head of household or spouse). The dependent binary variable equals 1 if the individual
initially inactive experiences a transition to an active labor status. To apply a diff-in-diff specification, we include variables
Treat (equals 1 for eligible inactive women—with children in poor and informal households), After (equals 1 for the
period 2010–2013), and the interaction between them. We also add other control variables: age, squared age,
educational level, marital status, binary indicators of the head of household and of whether the individual (or her/his
spouse) is in charge of household chores, labor status of the spouse, per capita family income, family size, number of
members by age and gender, region fixed effects, and time fixed effects (quarters). Clustered robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
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significant negative impact for women with one or two children, but not for mothers
with three children or more. This suggests that income effect is not the only—neither
the most relevant—channel that could be actively operating (Ferro and Nicollela 2007;
Gammage 2010). An alternative argument points out to the different elasticity of labor
supply for women with different number of children. For instance, if the elasticity is lar-
ger among poor women with just one or two kids—who could find assistance for child-
care from friends and relatives more easily than mothers with more children—then the
results in Table 8 are easier to explain. If the AUH tends to increase mother’s time
spending on childcare (and hence discourage labor participation), then this potential
change between eligible and ineligible groups may be negligible for large families.
Childcare requirements are relatively high for mothers with many children, regardless
the existence of the program.
Concerning the age of children, estimates in Table 9 indicate that the labor supply
impact of the AUH seems to be present for women with children aged 7 or more,
even though the effect is significant only for the group of mothers with children
from 7 to 14 years old.27 The effect disappears in mothers with younger children.
This heterogeneity may be consistent with the differential time required for taking
care of children depending on their age. Also, access to public childcare services is
Table 7 Effect of AUH on the probability of entering the labor force. Heterogeneities: woman’s education
Education
Low Medium High
Treat × After − 0.0286* − 0.00513 − 0.0620
(0.0155) (0.0190) (0.0418)
Observations 8061 8482 2809
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.055 0.089
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note: Probit estimates. The sample includes inactive married women
between 20 and 60 years old (head of household or spouse). The dependent binary variable equals 1 if the individual
initially inactive experiences a transition to an active labor status. To apply a diff-in-diff specification, we include variables
Treat (equals 1 for eligible inactive women—with children in poor and informal households), After (equals 1 for the
period 2010–2013), and the interaction between them. We also add other control variables: age, squared age,
educational level, marital status, binary indicators of the head of household and of whether the individual (or her/his
spouse) is in charge of household chores, labor status of the spouse, per capita family income, family size, number of
members by age and gender, region fixed effects, and time fixed effects (quarters). Clustered robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
Table 8 Effect of AUH on the probability of entering the labor force. Heterogeneities: number of children
Number of children
1–2 3–4 ≥ 5
Treat × After − 0.0324** 0.000196 0.00846
(0.0154) (0.0410) (0.0262)
Observations 8504 3414 721
Pseudo R2 0.039 0.085 0.214
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note: Probit estimates. The sample includes inactive married women
between 20 and 60 years old (head of household or spouse). The dependent binary variable equals 1 if the individual
initially inactive experiences a transition to an active labor status. To apply a diff-in-diff specification, we include variables
Treat (equals 1 for eligible inactive women—with children in poor and informal households), After (equals 1 for the
period 2010–2013), and the interaction between them. We also add other control variables: age, squared age,
educational level, marital status, binary indicators of the head of household and of whether the individual (or her/his
spouse) is in charge of household chores, labor status of the spouse, per capita family income, family size, number of
members by age and gender, region fixed effects, and time fixed effects (quarters). Clustered robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
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very limited in Argentina, while primary school coverage—starting at 6 years old—is
almost universal (Gasparini and Marchionni 2015; Marchionni and Alejo 2015).28
For these reasons, the elasticity of labor supply may be lower for mothers with small
kids and hence the impact of the program weaker.
The EPH survey identifies the two main individuals in charge of the domestic
chores within the household—it could be just one. We evaluate heterogeneous ef-
fects depending on whether it is the woman, her husband, or other family member
the one who bears most of the burden of domestic chores. Results in Table 10 sug-
gest that the labor disincentive effect is particularly significant for women in charge
of the housework and who do not receive any kind of domestic help from their
spouse or any other household member. Instead, the disincentive to participate in
the labor market disappears for women who are not in charge of household chores
or who receive assistance in such activities from other individuals. In summary, our
findings suggest that the cash transfers may be reinforcing the traditional gender
roles—women at home, men in the market—in those households with an already
traditional division of roles by gender. Although we are aware of the endogeneity
problems behind these results,29 we believe they point to a potential problem of gen-
der bias associated with the program design that deserves serious consideration.
Table 9 Effect of AUH on the probability of entering the labor force. Heterogeneities: age of
youngest child
Age of youngest child
0–3 4–6 7–10 11–14 15–17
Treat × After 0.00247 − 0.00556 − 0.0119* − 0.0361* − 0.0586
(0.00647) (0.0239) (0.00690) (0.0216) (0.0681)
Observations 4889 2328 2346 1934 1261
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.094 0.097 0.128 0.227
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note: Probit estimates. The sample includes inactive married women
between 20 and 60 years old (head of household or spouse). The dependent binary variable equals 1 if the individual
initially inactive experiences a transition to an active labor status. To apply a diff-in-diff specification, we include variables
Treat (equals 1 for eligible inactive women—with children in poor and informal households), After (equals 1 for the
period 2010–2013), and the interaction between them. We also add other control variables: age, squared age,
educational level, marital status, binary indicators of the head of household and of whether the individual (or her/his
spouse) is in charge of household chores, labor status of the spouse, per capita family income, family size, number of
members by age and gender, region fixed effects, and time fixed effects (quarters). Clustered robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
Table 10 Effect of AUH on the probability of entering the labor force. Heterogeneities: who are in
charge of domestic chores?
Women Spouse Other members
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Treat × After − 0.0284*** − 0.00731 0.00158 − 0.0268*** − 0.0437 − 0.0272***
(0.00783) (0.0190) (0.0218) (0.00804) (0.0431) (0.00832)
Observations 18,387 778 1100 18,161 2266 17,019
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.205 0.206 0.037 0.139 0.036
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note: Probit estimates. The sample includes inactive married women
between 20 and 60 years old (head of household or spouse). The dependent binary variable equals 1 if the individual
initially inactive experiences a transition to an active labor status. To apply a diff-in-diff specification, we include variables
Treat (equals 1 for eligible inactive women—with children in poor and informal households), After (equals 1 for the
period 2010–2013), and the interaction between them. We also add other control variables: age, squared age,
educational level, marital status, binary indicators of the head of household and of whether the individual (or her/his
spouse) is in charge of household chores, labor status of the spouse, per capita family income, family size, number of
members by age and gender, region fixed effects, and time fixed effects (quarters). Clustered robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
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5.2 Impact on other labor transitions
We also explore whether the AUH affects other labor transitions besides the one
from inactivity to activity. In particular, we evaluate the potential incentive on active
women to leave the labor market and become inactive and on employed women to
quit their jobs and become unemployed or inactive. To that aim, we define new esti-
mation samples and outcome variables.30 The results are reported in Table 11.
We find no evidence of changes in the probability that active women or men be-
come inactive. This result suggests an asymmetric response to the income transfer of
active and inactive women. Interestingly, these differential effects on female labor
transitions may help us understand the observed fall of the labor force participation
rate for eligible women after the AUH implementation. In fact, the latter event
seems to be mainly explained by a lower entrance rate of eligible mothers into the
labor force (Table 3) and not by a significant change between groups in the corre-
sponding exit rate (Table 11).
The last columns of Table 11 show that both women and men do not experience a
significant change in the transitions from employment to unemployment or inactivity
after the AUH.
5.3 Effect on labor intensity
We finally evaluate the potential change in the total hours worked between groups,
before and after the AUH. In this case, the analysis is restricted to those women who
remain employed throughout the four quarters of each follow-up period. We esti-
mate the treatment effect using the two-step Heckman selection model which allows
us to correct the selection bias arising from female labor participation. This will be
represented by the probability of women being employed during the whole monitor-
ing period. To measure labor intensity, we calculate the change in the total hours
worked per week normalized by the intertemporal average labor intensity of each
woman. To carry out this methodology, we assume that there are certain women’s
characteristics that affect both labor participation and intensity (age, education, re-
gion) while others are specific explanatory factors of the total hours worked or the
probability of being employed.
Table 11 Effect of AUH on the probability of exiting the labor force. Active-inactive, employed-not
employed
Active-inactive Employed-not employed
Women Men Women Men
Treat × After 0.00239 0.00212 0.00125 − 0.000957
(0.00665) (0.00403) (0.00739) (0.00578)
Observations 34,491 47,092 32,666 44,633
Pseudo R2 0.087 0.112 0.074 0.059
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note: Probit estimates. The sample includes active (employed) women or
men (head of household or spouse). The age range is 20–60 for women and 20–65 for men. The dependent binary
variable equals 1 if the individual experiences a transition towards inactivity (not-employed) from an active (employed)
labor status. To apply a diff-in-diff specification, we include variables Treat (equals 1 for eligible women—with children in
poor and informal households), After (equals 1 for the period 2010–2013), and the interaction between them. We also
add other control variables: age, squared age, educational level, marital status, binary indicators of the head of
household and of whether the individual (or her/his spouse) is in charge of household chores, labor status of the spouse,
per capita family income, family size, number of members by age and gender, region fixed effects, and time fixed effects
(quarters). Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
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As it was shown above, the program does not seem to have generated a sufficient
stimulus for active or employed women to move out of the labor force. However, it
is possible that eligible employed mothers may be driven to work fewer hours com-
pared to the counterfactual situation in the absence of the policy. We hence explore
the potential effect of the AUH on female labor intensity (hours of work), following
the arguments in Section 3 and applying the methodology described above for this
purpose (two-step Heckman selection model). Table 12 shows a significant fall in the
total working hours of beneficiary women after the AUH. Again, the effect is particu-
larly significant for married women, whereas the impact disappears for single
mothers. Male hours of work do not change between eligible and non-eligible groups
with the introduction of the AUH.
This female labor intensity effect represents an average reduction of 6.5% of mean
working hours, which is equivalent to an average fall of almost 3 h per week. How-
ever, contrary to the results for labor participation, Table 13 suggests that the impact
on hours of work is not robust to different specifications of the control group.
6 Conclusions
We assess the impact on female labor force participation of a conditional cash transfer
program implemented in Argentina in 2009 that delivers cash benefits to poor and
non-formal households with children. For this purpose, and given the program design
Table 12 Effect of the AUH on labor intensity. Women and men (total hours worked)
Women
(without Heckman)
All
women
Married
women
Single
women
Men
Treat × After − 0.0872** − 0.0652*** − 0.0759** − 0.0519 − 0.0155
(0.0345) (0.0236) (0.0317) (0.0355) (0.0540)
Individual and household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional and time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mills lambda – 0.437 0.326 0.238 2.060
– (1.230) (1.107) (0.703) (5.026)
Rho – 0.694 0.519 0.378 1.000
Sigma – 0.630 0.629 0.630 2.060
Lambda – 0.437 0.326 0.238 2.060
Observations 28,102 65,722 50,349 15,373 58,243
Censored – 37,620 31,286 6334 12,882
Not censored – 28,102 19,063 9039 45,361
R2 0.006 – – – –
Wald chi2 (57) – 116.58 90.59 80.12 7.54
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EPH data. Note 1: Sample is restricted to employed individuals during the whole
period (the age range is 20–60 for women and 20–65 for men). The dependent variable measures the change in the
total hours worked per week normalized by the intertemporal average labor intensity of each woman/man. To apply a
diff-in-diff specification, we include variables Treat (equals 1 for eligible women/men—with children in poor and informal
households), After (equals 1 for the period 2010–2013), and the interaction between them (Treat × After). We also add
other control variables: age, squared age, educational level, marital status, the activity sector in which she/he is
employed, binary indicators of the head of household and of whether the individual is in charge of household chores,
labor status of the spouse, per capita family income, family size, number of members by age and gender, region fixed
effects, and time fixed effects (quarters). Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
Note 2: Two-step Heckman selection model is applied to correct the selection bias arising from labor participation equation
(probability of being employed in all periods we observe each individual). The selection equation to obtain Heckman’s two-
step consistent estimates includes the following control variables: age; squared age; educational level; marital status; binary
indicators of the head of household, if she/he lives in poor, informal households with children, and of whether the individual
(or her/his spouse) is in charge of household chores; region fixed effects; and time fixed effects (quarters)
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and the nonrandom assignment of the beneficiaries, we use a non-experimental meth-
odology of double differences and identify the potential participants according to the
criteria and conditionalities of the program. The evidence suggests the existence of sta-
tistically significant disincentives to labor force participation of women driven by the
program, but instead, we find nonsignificant effects for men. The AUH also seems to
affect female labor intensity, although this result is not entirely robust to different alter-
native specifications of the control group.
The welfare implications of this result are not clear. Lower labor participation could
be detrimental to women empowerment and may offset part of the poverty-reducing
impact of the program. On the other hand, the monetary transfer of the program may
allow poor women to avoid taking a low-pay job and instead stay at home with their
children, which could be beneficial to their education given the scarcity of other good-
quality options. More research is needed to have a more comprehensive view of these
changes in behavior.
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set at ARS 720.
11As for June 2015, the monthly transfer for disabled children was ARS 2730.
12In the next section, we also analyze other transitions potentially affected by the
AUH: active-inactive and employed-not employed.
13We do not include subsequent periods in order to isolate the estimation of this
labor impact of the AUH from the potential labor incidence of the program
PROGRESAR implemented in 2014. For a more detailed explanation of this policy, see
http://www.progresar.anses.gob.ar/.
14The EPH asks salaried workers whether they contribute to the pension system
through deductions from their wages as a way to identify informal labor arrangements.
This is precisely the question used in the literature as the main proxy for informality
(Tornarolli et al. 2014).
15Some self-employed workers could in principle be paying social security taxes and
receiving basic social security coverage if their earnings are above some threshold, but
almost no worker in our sample is in this situation.
16Results hold when using alternative income measures and poverty lines.
17There are other alternative ways to define the transition from inactivity to activity.
For instance, we could check for inactivity (activity) in only one of the first (second)
two appearances. We find that results hold when using different definitions of the
transition.
18Also, the binary indicator After equals 1 for women that entered the EPH previous
to the AUH inception but were interviewed for the last time after that moment. These
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women made the transition at some unobserved time that could be either before or
after the AUH. Results are robust to changes in the way we treat these observations,
i.e., to whether they are considered as part of the “before” or “after” period, or even
when we exclude them from the sample.
19We run the same exercise for men and the corresponding mean value for both the
treatment and control group remain almost unchanged. Results are available upon request.
20The corresponding F statistic is F(18,12,178) = 0.59, with Prob > F = 0.91. We run
the same test restricting the analysis to married women and find similar results
(F(18,10,662) = 0.66, Prob > F = 0.85).
21The results of Table 3 hold when using the linear specification in Eq. 1. These OLS
estimations are available upon request.
22Recall that even though family income is not monitored in practice, income poverty
is a likely condition for households not to self-select out of the program.
23The non-significance of the coefficient in the last column may be also due to the
small number of observations in this group.
24The international literature of welfare systems provides evidence of a negative elasticity
of female labor force participation, which seems to be larger for the least skilled women
and also declines with skill. See Anderson and Levine (2000) and Lehrer and Nerlove
(1981) for a more detailed discussion of women’s education and labor participation.
25For further discussion of the impact of children on women’s labor supply, see
Angrist and Evans (1998). These authors find that the labor market consequences of an
increase in family size tend to be more severe for poor and less educated women.
26In a previous study of the AUH, Garganta and Gasparini (2015) find that the labor
disincentive towards formality generated by the program is significantly higher for
workers with more children.
27Although the estimated coefficient for the group of mothers with children aged 15–
17 is negative and relatively high, the corresponding treatment effect is not significant.
28For instance, based on a regression-discontinuity analysis for Argentina, Berlinski et
al. (2011) find that preschool attendance of the youngest child in the household in-
creases the probability of full-time employment and weekly hours of maternal
employment.
29Women’s decision not to participate in the labor market may in turn affect other
household members’ involvement with domestic chores.
30The sample for these new estimations includes active or employed women and men
who are the spouse or the head of their households. The age range considered is also
20–60 for women and 20–65 for men. The outcome variables to measure these new
labor changeovers are again binary indicators taking the value 1 for active (employed)
women and men in year t − 1 who make a transition to inactivity (unemployed or in-
activity) during the following year (in year t).
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